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Using a stock-flow-fund ecological macroeconomic model, we analyse (i) the effects of climate 
change on financial stability and (ii) the financial and global warming implications of a green QE 
programme. Emphasis is placed on the impact of climate change damages on the price of financial 
assets and the financial position of firms and banks. The model is estimated and calibrated using global 
data and simulations are conducted for the period 2015-2115. Four key results arise. First, by 
destroying the capital of firms and reducing their profitability, climate change is likely to gradually 
deteriorate the liquidity of firms, leading to a higher rate of default that could harm both the financial 
and the non-financial corporate sector. Second, climate change damages can lead to a portfolio 
reallocation that can cause a gradual decline in the price of corporate bonds. Third, financial instability 
might adversely affect credit expansion and the investment in green capital, with adverse feedback 
effects on climate change. Fourth, the implementation of a green QE programme can reduce climate-
induced financial instability and restrict global warming. The effectiveness of this programme depends 
positively on the responsiveness of green investment to changes in bond yields. 
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Climate change, financial stability and monetary policy 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Climate change is likely to have severe effects on the stability of the financial system (see, for 
instance, Aglietta and Espagne, 2016; Batten et al., 2016; Scott et al., 2017). Two broad climate-
related financial risks have been identified: (a) the transition risks that have to do with the re-pricing 
of carbon-intensive assets as a result of the transition to a low-carbon economy; (b) the physical 
risks that are linked to the economic damages of climate-related events. So far, most studies have 
concentrated on the implications of transition risks (see e.g. Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011; 
Johnson, 2012; Plantinga and Scholtens, 2016; Battiston et al., 2017). Less attention has been paid 
to the detailed analysis of the physical risks. The investigation of these risks is particularly 
important because it would help us understand how the financial system could be impaired if the 
transition to a low-carbon economy is very slow in the next decades (and, consequently, severe 
global warming is not ultimately avoided). 
 
In this paper, we develop an ecological macroeconomic model that sheds light on the physical 
effects of climate change on financial stability. This is called the DEFINE (Dynamic Ecosystem-
FINance-Economy) model which builds on the stock-flow-fund model of Dafermos et al. (2017). 
The latter relies on a novel synthesis of the stock-flow consistent approach of Godley and Lavoie 
(2007) with the flow-fund model of Georgescu-Roegen (1971, ch. 9; 1979; 1984).1 The model is 
calibrated and estimated using global data and simulations are presented which illustrate the 
effects of climate change on the financial system. We pay attention to the following key channels. 
First, the increase in temperature and the economic catastrophes caused by climate change could 
reduce the profitability of firms and could deteriorate their financial position. Accordingly, debt 
defaults could arise which would lead to systemic bank losses. Second, lower firm profitability 
combined with global warming-related damages can affect the confidence of investors, inducing a 
rise in liquidity preference and a fire sale of the financial assets issued by the corporate sector.  
 
Dietz et al. (2016) have recently investigated quantitatively the physical impact of climate change 
on the financial system. They use a standard Integrated Assessment model (IAM) and the climate 
                                                 
1 See the model’s website: www.define-model.org. 
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value at risk (VAR) framework. Assuming that climate change can reduce the dividend payments 
of firms and, hence, the price of financial assets, they provide various estimates about the climate-
induced loss in the value of financial assets. Our study moves beyond their analysis in three 
different ways. First, by relying on the stock-flow consistent approach, we portray explicitly the 
balance sheets and the financial flows in the financial sector. This allows us to model the climate-
induced fragility that can be caused in the financial structures of firms and banks, a feature which 
is absent in Dietz et al. (2016). Second, we utilise a multiple financial asset portfolio choice 
framework which permits an explicit analysis of the climate-induced effects on the demand of 
financial assets in a world of fundamental uncertainty. This allows us to capture the implications 
of a fire sale of certain financial assets. These implications are not explicitly considered in the 
model of Dietz et al. (2016) where climate damages do not have diversified effects on different 
financial assets. Third, the financial system in our model has a non-neutral impact on economic 
activity: credit availability and the price of financial assets affect economic growth and 
employment. Accordingly, the interactions between economic performance and financial 
(in)stability are explicitly taken into account. This is crucial since the feedback economic effects of 
bank losses and asset price deflation can exacerbate climate-induced financial instability (see 
Batten et al., 2016). On the contrary, Dietz et al. (2016) utilise a neoclassical growth framework 
where long-run growth is independent of the financial structure of firms and banks. This leaves 
little room for the analysis of the macroeconomic implications of climate-induced financial 
problems.  
 
Our simulation results illustrate that in a business as usual scenario climate change is likely to have 
important adverse effects on the default of firms, the leverage of banks and the price of financial 
assets. Remarkably, this climate-induced financial instability causes problems in the financing of 
green investment disrupting the transition to a low-carbon and more ecologically efficient 
economy.  
 
An additional contribution of this paper is that it examines how monetary policy could reduce the 
risks imposed on the financial system by climate change. Drawing on the recent discussions about 
the potential use of monetary policy in tackling climate change (see e.g. Murphy and Hines, 2010; 
Werner, 2012; Rozenberg et al., 2013; Anderson, 2015; Barkawi and Monnin, 2015; Campiglio, 
2016; Matikainen et al., 2017; UN Environment Inquiry, 2017; Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018), 
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we examine the extent to which a global green quantitative easing (QE) programme could 
ameliorate the financial distress caused by climate change. This programme involves the purchase 
of green corporate bonds. The simulations presented about the effects of a green QE programme 
are of growing relevance since in a world of climate change central banks might not be able to 
safeguard financial stability without using new unconventional tools in a prudential manner. 
 
The paper’s outline is as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model and the key 
equations that capture the links between climate change, financial stability and monetary policy. 
Section 3 describes the calibration, estimation and validation of the model. Section 4 analyses our 
simulations about the effects of climate change on the financial system. Section 5 focuses on the 
impact of a green QE programme. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
The DEFINE 1.0 model (version: 09-2017) consists of two big blocks: (i) the ‘ecosystem’ block 
that encapsulates the carbon cycle, the interaction between temperature and carbon, the 
flows/stocks of energy and matter and the evolution of ecological efficiency indicators; (ii) the 
‘macroeconomy and financial system’ block that includes the financial transactions, the balance 
sheet structure and the behaviour of households, firms, banks, central banks and the government 
sector. 
 
Firms produce one type of material good which is used for durable consumption and investment 
purposes. The matter that is necessary in the production process is either extracted from the 
ground or comes from recycling the demolished/discarded socio-economic stock.2 Energy is 
produced by using both renewable and non-renewable sources. Production results in CO2 
emissions and waste. A distinction is made between green and conventional capital. The higher 
the use of green capital the lower the energy and material intensity and the higher the recycling 
rate and the use of renewables.  
 
                                                 
2 The socio-economic stock includes capital goods and durable consumption goods. 
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Firms invest in conventional and green capital by using retained profits, loans and bonds. Banks 
impose credit rationing on firm loans. This means that they play an active role in the 
determination of output and the accumulation of green capital. Households receive labour 
income, buy durable consumption goods and accumulate wealth in the form of deposits, 
corporate bonds and government securities. There are no household loans. Commercial banks 
accumulate capital and distribute part of their profits to households. Central banks determine the 
base interest rate, provide liquidity to the commercial banks and purchase government securities 
and corporate bonds. Governments collect taxes and conduct fiscal policy. Inflation has been 
assumed away and, for simplicity, the price of goods is equal to unity. We use US dollar ($) as a 
reference currency.  
 
The skeleton of the model is captured by four matrices:  
 
(1) The physical flow matrix (Table 1) which portrays the inflows and the outflows of matter and 
energy that take place as a result of the production process. The First Law of Thermodynamics 
implies that energy and matter cannot be created or destroyed. This is reflected in the material and 
energy balance.  
Table 1: Physical flow matrix  
Material 
balance
Energy 
balance
Inputs
Extracted matter +M
Renewable energy +ER
Non-renewable energy +CEN +EN
Oxygen +O2
Outputs
Industrial CO2 emissions -EMIS IN
Waste -W
Dissipated energy -ED
Change in socio-economic stock -ΔSES
Total 0 0  
Note: The table refers to annual global flows. Matter is measured in Gt and energy is measured in EJ. 
 
(2) The physical stock-flow matrix (Table 2) which presents the dynamic change in material and 
non-renewable energy reserves, the atmospheric CO2 concentration, the socio-economic stock 
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and the stock of hazardous waste. The first row of the matrix shows the stocks of the previous 
year. The last row presents the stocks at the end of the current year. Additions to stocks are 
denoted by a plus sign. Reductions of stocks are denoted by a minus sign. 
 
Table 2: Physical stock-flow matrix 
Material 
reserves
Non-renewable 
energy reserves
Atmospheric CO2
 concentration
Socio-economic 
stock
Hazardous
waste
Opening stock REV M -1 REV E -1 CO2 AT -1 SES -1 HWS -1
Additions to stock
   Resources converted into reserves +CONV M +CONV E
   CO2 emissions +EMIS
   Production of material goods +MY
   Non-recycled hazardous waste +hazW
Reductions of stock
   Extraction -M -EN
   Net transfer to oceans/bioshpere
   Demolished/disposed material goods -DEM
Closing stock REV M REV E CO2 AT SES HWS
  121111 221   UPAT COCO 
 
Note: The table refers to annual global stocks and flows. Matter is measured in Gt and energy is measured in EJ. 
 
(3) The transactions flow matrix (Table 3) which shows the transactions that take place between 
the various sectors of the economy. Inflows are denoted by a plus sign and outflows are denoted 
by a minus sign. 
 
(4) The balance sheet matrix (Table 4) which includes the assets and the liabilities of the sectors. 
We use a plus sign for assets and a minus sign for liabilities. 
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Table 3: Transactions flow matrix 
Households Government sector Total
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital
Consumption -C +C 0
Government expenditures +G -G 0
Conventional investment +I C -I C 0
Green investment +I G -I G 0
Wages +wN -wN 0
Taxes -T H -T F +T 0
Firms' profits +DP -TP +RP 0
Commercial banks' profits +BP D -BP +BP U 0
Interest on deposits +int D D -1  -int D D -1 0
Capital depreciation -δK -1 +δK -1 0
Interest on conventional loans -int C L C-1 +int C L C-1 0
Interest on green loans -int GL G-1 +int GL G-1 0
Interest on conventional bonds +coupon Cb CH-1 -coupon C b C-1 +coupon C b CCB-1 0
Interest on green bonds +coupon Gb GH-1 -coupon Gb G-1 +coupon Gb GCB-1 0
Interest on government securities +int S SEC H-1 +int S SEC B-1 -int S SEC -1 +int S SEC CB-1 0
Interest on advances -int AA -1 +int AA -1 0
Central bank's profits +CBP -CBP 0
Bailout of banks +BAILOUT -BAILOUT 0
Δdeposits -ΔD +ΔD 0
Δconventional loans +ΔL C -ΔL C 0
Δgreen loans +ΔL G -ΔL G 0
Δconventional bonds -p CΔb CH +p C Δb C -p C Δb CCB 0
Δgreen bonds -p GΔb GH +p GΔb G -p GΔb GCB 0
Δgovernment securities -ΔSEC H -ΔSEC B +ΔSEC -ΔSEC CB 0
Δadvances +ΔA -ΔA 0
Δhigh-powered money -ΔHPM +ΔHPM 0
Defaulted loans +DL -DL 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Firms Commercial banks Central banks
 
Note: The table refers to annual global flows in trillion US$. 
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Table 4: Balance sheet matrix 
Households Firms Commercial 
banks
Government 
sector
Central 
banks
Total
Conventional capital +K C +K C
Green capital +K G +K G
Durable consumption goods +DC +DC
Deposits +D -D 0
Conventional loans -L C +L C 0
Green loans -L G +L G 0
Conventional bonds +p C b CH -p C b C +p C b CCB 0
Green bonds +p G b GH -p G b G +p G b GCB 0
Government securities +SEC H +SEC B -SEC +SEC CB 0
High-powered money +HPM -HPM 0
Advances -A +A 0
Total (net worth) +V H +V F +K B -SEC +V CB +K C +K G +DC  
Note: The table refers to annual global stocks in trillion US$. 
 
The model extends the model developed by Dafermos et al. (2017) by including a bond market, 
central banking, the government sector, household portfolio choice and an endogenous rate of 
default for firms. In what follows we present the equations of the model that are more relevant 
for the interactions between climate change, financial stability and monetary policy. The full list of 
equations is reported in Appendix A. Additional details about the foundations of the model and 
the justification of the equations can be found in Dafermos et al. (2017). 
 
2.1. Emissions and climate change 
 
The equations about emissions and climate change draw on Nordhaus (2016). Every year 
industrial CO2 emissions ( INEMIS ) are generated due to the use of non-renewable energy sources 
( EN ): 
 
ENEMISIN   (1) 
 
where   is the CO2 intensity, defined as the industrial emissions produced per unit of non-
renewable energy use.  
 
Every year land-use CO2 emissions ( LEMIS ) are also generated because of changes in the use of 
land (Eq. 2). These emissions are assumed to decline exogenously at a rate lr :  
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 lrEMISEMIS LL   11  (2) 
 
Total CO2 emissions ( EMIS ) are given by:  
 
LIN EMISEMISEMIS   (3) 
 
The carbon cycle, represented by Eqs. (4)-(6), shows that every year there is exchange of carbon 
between the atmosphere and the upper ocean/biosphere and between the upper ocean/biosphere 
and the lower ocean. In particular, we have: 
 
121111 222   UPATAT COCOEMISCO   (4) 
132122112 2222   LOUPATUP COCOCOCO   (5) 
133123 222   LOUPLO COCOCO   (6) 
 
where ATCO2  is the atmospheric CO2 concentration, UPCO2  is the upper ocean/biosphere CO2 
concentration and LOCO2  is the lower ocean CO2 concentration. 
 
The accumulation of atmospheric CO2 and other greenhouse gases increases radiative forcing ( F ) 
as follows:  
 
EX
PREAT
AT
CO F
CO
CO
logFF 


2
2
222  (7) 
 
where 22 COF   is the increase in radiative forcing (since the pre-industrial period) due to doubling 
of CO2 concentration from pre-industrial levels ( PREATCO 2 ). For simplicity, the radiative forcing 
due to non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions ( EXF ) is determined exogenously: 
 
fexFF EXEX  1  (8) 
 
where fex  is the annual increase in radiative forcing (since the pre-industrial period) due to non-
CO2 agents. 
 
As shown in Eq. (9), the rise in radiative forcing places upward pressures on atmospheric 
temperature ( ATT ):  
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 





 

 1121
22
11 LOATAT
CO
ATAT TTtT
S
F
FtTT  (9) 
 
where S  is the equilibrium climate sensitivity, i.e. the increase in equilibrium temperature due to 
doubling of CO2 concentration from pre-industrial levels. 
 
The temperature of the lower oceans ( LOT ) is given by: 
 
 1131   LOATLOLO TTtTT  (10) 
 
2.2. Green capital, energy intensity and renewable energy 
 
Green capital allows firms to produce the same output with less energy. This is captured by the 
following logistic function: 
 
 CG KK
minmax
max
e 651





  (11) 
 
where   is energy intensity and max  and min  are, respectively, the maximum and the minimum 
potential values of energy intensity. As the ratio of green capital ( GK ) to conventional capital 
( CK ) increases, energy intensity goes down. The use of the logistic function implies that the 
installation of green capital (relative to conventional capital) initially generates a slow 
improvement in energy intensity. However, as installation expands further, the improvement 
reaches a take-off point after which energy intensity improves much more rapidly due to the 
learning obtained from installation experience and the overall expansion of green capital 
infrastructure. Finally, as energy intensity approaches its potential minimum, improvement starts 
to slow. 
 
A similar logistic function is used for the effects of green capital accumulation on the share of 
renewable energy in total energy produced ( ): 
 
 CG KKe 871
1



  (12) 
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By definition, the maximum potential value of   is 1. Note that in Dafermos et al. (2017) the 
formulation of the links between green capital and ecological efficiency indicators is quite 
different since it does not rely on logistic functions. The use of logistic functions in the present 
model allows for a more realistic representation that takes into account the processes of learning-
by-doing and learning-by-installation which play a key role in the diffusion of new technologies. 
 
2.3. Output determination and damages 
 
Eq. (13) shows our Leontief-type production function:  
 
 *N*K*E*M* Y,Y,Y,YminY   (13) 
 
where *Y  is the potential output. The potential output is the minimum of (i) the matter-
determined potential output ( *MY ) which depends on material reserves, (ii) the energy-determined 
potential output ( *EY ) which is a function of non-renewable energy reserves, (iii) the capital-
determined potential output ( *KY ) that relies on capital stock and capital productivity, and (iv) the 
labour-determined potential output ( *NY ) which depends on labour force and labour productivity. 
 
The actual output (Y ) is demand-determined. Aggregate demand is equal to consumption 
expenditures (C ) plus investment expenditures ( I ) plus government expenditures (G ):  
 
GICY   (14) 
 
However, demand is not independent of supply. When Y  approaches *Y , demand tends to 
decline due to supply-side constraints (this is achieved via our investment function described 
below).  
 
Output determination is affected by climate change as follows: global warming causes damages to 
capital stock and capital productivity, decreasing *KY ; it also causes damages to labour force and 
labour productivity, reducing *NY  (see Dafermos et al., 2017 and the references therein). These 
damages (a) deteriorate the expectations of households and firms, reducing consumption and 
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investment, and, hence aggregate demand3 and (b) increase the scarcity of capital and labour 
placing downward pressures on aggregate demand via the supply constraints.  
 
Eq. (15) is the damage function, which shows how atmospheric temperature and damages are 
linked:  
 
7546
3
2
211
1
1
.
ATATAT
T
TTT
D
 
  (15) 
 
TD  is the proportional damage which lies between 0 (no damage) and 1 (complete catastrophe). 
Eq. (15) has been proposed by Weitzman (2012). The variable TD  enters into both (i) the 
determination of capital and labour and their productivities and (ii) the consumption and 
investment demand. In our baseline scenario we assume that 50.DT   when CT
o6 .4  
 
2.4. The financing of investment  
 
Firms’ investment is formalised as a two-stage process. At a first stage, firms decide their overall 
desired investment in both green and conventional capital. At a second stage, they allocate their 
desired investment between the two types of capital. Eq. (16) captures the first stage:  
 
 1111111111 1,,,,, 











 













 TI
D DKKKumueurgruI    (16) 
 
Desired investment ( DI ), adjusted for the damage effect, is given by net investment plus the 
depreciated capital;   is the depreciation rate of capital stock. Net investment is affected by a 
number of factors. First, following the Kaleckian approach (see e.g. Blecker, 2002), it depends 
positively on the rate of (retained) profits ( r ) and the rate of capacity utilisation ( u ). The impact 
of these factors is assumed to be non-linear in general line with the tradition that draws on Kaldor 
(1940). This means that when the profit rate and capacity utilisation are very low or very high 
their effects on investment become rather small. Second, investment is also a negative function of 
the growth rate of energy intensity ( g ). This captures the rebound effect linked to the fact that 
firms invest more when energy intensity declines, since energy costs go down. This higher 
                                                 
3 For some empirical evidence about the impact of natural disasters on the saving behaviour of households, see 
Skidmore (2001).  
4 Our damage function captures the aggregate effects of climate change. For a damage function that considers 
explicitly the heterogeneity of climate shocks across agents, see Lamperti et al. (2017).  
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investment increases the use of energy, partially offsetting the positive effects of energy efficiency 
improvements.5 Third, following Skott and Zipperer (2012), we assume a non-linear impact of 
unemployment rate (ur ) on investment: when unemployment approaches zero, there is a scarcity 
of labour that discourages entrepreneurs to invest. This means that, by reducing labour 
productivity and labour force (and, hence, unemployment), climate change can have a negative 
impact on investment. Fourth, the scarcity of energy and material resources can dampen 
investment, for example because of a rise in resource prices; ue  and um  capture the utilisation of 
energy and material resources respectively. This impact, however, is highly non-linear: energy and 
material scarcity affects investment only when the depletion of the resources has become very 
severe. Fifth, in order to capture exogenous random factors that might affect desired investment, 
we have assumed that DI  also depends on a random component, I , that follows a stochastic 
AR(1) process. Overall, our investment function implies that demand declines (or stops 
increasing) when it approaches potential output. This allows us to take explicit into account the 
environmental supply-side effects on aggregate demand mentioned above. 
 
Eqs. (17) and (18) refer to the second stage of firms’ investment process: 
 
DD
G II   (17) 
D
G
DD
C III   (18) 
 
where   is the share of green investment ( DGI ) in overall desired investment (Eq. 17). Desired 
conventional investment ( D
CI ) is determined as a residual (Eq. 18).  
 
Eq. (19) shows that the share of green investment depends on three factors: 
 
      131111210 1   TCGLCGL Dyieldyieldshintintsh   (19) 
 
where Cint  is the interest rate on conventional loans, Gint  is the interest rate on green loans, 
Cyield  is the yield on conventional bonds, Gyield  is the yield on green bonds and Lsh  is the share 
of loans in the total liabilities of firms (loans plus bonds).  
 
The first factor, captured by the term 10   , reflects exogenous institutional or technological 
developments that affect the investment in green capital. The second factor, captured by the term 
                                                 
5 For a description of the rebound effects see Barker et al. (2009). 
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     11112 1   CGLCGL yieldyieldshintintsh , reflects the borrowing cost of investing in green 
capital relative to conventional capital. As the cost of borrowing of green capital (via bank lending 
or bonds) declines compared to conventional capital, firms tend to increase green investment. 
Finally, we posit that climate change damages lead to more green investment since these damages 
induce firms to increase mitigation and might lead governments to adopt stricter regulation 
against the investment in conventional capital. 
 
As mentioned above, retained profits are not in general sufficient to cover the desired investment 
expenditures. This means that firms need external finance, which is obtained via bonds and bank 
loans. It is assumed that firms first issue bonds and then demand new loans from banks in order 
to cover the rest amount of their desired expenditures. Only a proportion of the demanded new 
loans is provided. In other words, the model assumes that there is a quantity rationing of credit. 
This is in line with recent empirical evidence that shows that the quantity rationing of credit is a 
more important driver of macroeconomic activity than the price rationing of credit (see Jakab and 
Kumhof, 2015).  
 
For simplicity, the long-term bonds issued by firms are never redeemed. The proportion of firms’ 
desired investment which is funded via bonds is given by: 
 
C
D
C
CC
p
Ix
bb
1
1    (20) 
G
D
G
GG
p
Ix
bb
2
1    (21) 
 
where Cb  is the number of conventional bonds, Gb  is the number of green bonds, 1x  is the 
proportion of firms’ conventional desired investment financed via bonds, 2x  is the proportion of 
firms’ green desired investment funded via bonds, Cp  is the price of conventional bonds and Gp  
is the price of green bonds. 
 
The proportion of desired investment covered by green or conventional bonds is a negative 
function of the bond yield. Formally: 
 
111101  Cyieldxxx  (22) 
121202  Gyieldxxx  (23) 
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We postulate a price-clearing mechanism in the bond market: 
 
C
C
C
b
B
p   (24) 
G
G
G
b
B
p   (25) 
 
where CB  and GB  denote the value of conventional and green bonds held by households and 
central banks. Prices tend to increase whenever households and central banks hold a higher 
amount of corporate bonds in their portfolio. A rise in the price of bonds produces a decline in 
the bond yield, which has two effects on firms’ investment. First, since firms pay a lower interest 
rate on bonds, their profitability improves increasing their desired investment. Second, a lower 
bond yield (which can result from a rise in bond prices) induces firms to increase the proportion 
of desired investment covered via bonds. This is crucial because firms need to rely less on bank 
lending in order to finance their investment. The disadvantage of bank lending is that, due to 
credit rationing, banks provide only a proportion of the loans demanded by firms. Accordingly, 
the less firms rely on bank loans in order to finance their desired investment the higher their 
ability to undertake their desired investment. 
 
Based on firms’ budget constraint, the new loans are determined as follows:  
 
GGGG
D
G
D
G bpKrepLRPINL    11  (26) 
  CCCCDCDC bpKrepLRPINL    111  (27) 
 
where D
GNL  denotes the desired new green loans, 
D
CNL  denotes the desired new conventional 
loans, GL  is the outstanding amount of green loans, CL  is the outstanding amount of 
conventional loans and RP  denotes the retained profits of firms.  
 
Firms might default on their loans. When this happens, a part of their accumulated loans is not 
repaid, deteriorating the financial position of banks. The amount of defaulted loans ( DL ) is equal 
to: 
 
1 defLDL  (28) 
 
where L  denotes the total loans of firms. 
15 
 
 
The rate of default ( def ) is assumed to increase when firms become less liquid. The illiquidity of 
firms is captured by an illiquidity ratio, illiq , which expresses the cash outflows of firms relative to 
their cash inflows. Cash outflows include wages, interest, taxes, loan repayments and maintenance 
capital expenditures (which are equal to depreciation). Cash inflows comprise the revenues from 
sales and the funds obtained from bank loans and the issuance of bonds. The default rate is a 
non-linear positive function of illiq : 
 








1illiqfdef  (29) 
 
Eq. (29) suggests that, as cash outflows increase compared to cash inflows, the ability of firms to 
repay their debt declines. 
 
2.5. The portfolio choice of households 
 
Households invest their expected financial wealth ( HFV ) in four different assets: government 
securities ( HSEC ), conventional corporate bonds ( CHB ), green corporate bonds ( GHB ) and 
deposits ( D ); Sint  is the interest rate on government securities and Dint  is the interest rate on 
deposits. In the portfolio choice, captured by Eqs. (30)-(33n), Godley’s (1999) imperfect asset 
substitutability framework is adopted.6  
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GHGCHCH bpbpSECCDD   1  (33) 
 
Households’ asset allocation is driven by three factors. The first factor is the global warming 
damages. We posit that damages affect households’ confidence and increase the precautionary 
                                                 
6 The parameters in the portfolio choice equations satisfy the horizontal, vertical and symmetry constraints.  
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demand for more liquid and less risky assets (see also Batten et al., 2016). Since damages destroy 
capital and the profitability opportunities of firms, we assume that as TD  increases, households 
reduce their holding of corporate conventional bonds and increase the proportion of their wealth 
held in deposits and government securities which are considered safer.7 Second, asset allocation 
responds to alterations in the relative rates on return. The holding of each asset relies positively 
on its own rate of return and negatively on the other asset’s rate of return. Third, a rise in the 
transactions demand for money (as a result of higher expected income) induces households to 
substitute deposits for other assets.8 
 
2.6. Credit rationing and bank leverage 
 
As mentioned above, banks impose credit rationing on the loans demanded by firms: they supply 
only a proportion of demanded loans. Following the empirical evidence presented in Lown and 
Morgan (2006), the degree of credit rationing both on conventional loans ( CCR ) and green loans 
( GCR ) relies on the financial health of both firms and banks. In particular, credit rationing 
increases as the debt service ratio of firms ( dsr ) increases,9 as the bank leverage ( Blev ) approaches 
its maximum acceptable value ( maxBlev ) and as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR ) approaches its 
minimum acceptable value ( minCAR ): 10 
 
    CRminmaxBBC CARCAR,levlev,dsrrCR 












 111
 (34) 
    CRminmaxBBG CARCAR,levlev,dsrlCR 












 111
 (35) 
 
As in the case of investment, we assume that credit rationing is also dependent on a random 
component, CR , that follows a stochastic AR(1) process.  
 
                                                 
7 It could be argued that the demand for green corporate bonds is also affected negatively by the climate change 
damages that harm firms’ financial position. However, climate change damages might at the same time induce 
households to hold more green bonds in order to contribute to the restriction of global warming. Hence, the overall 
impact of damages on the demand of green bonds is ambiguous. For this reason, we assume that 030 '  in our 
simulations.  
8 Note that balance sheet restrictions require that Eq. (33n) must be replaced by Eq. (33) in the computer simulations. 
9 The debt service ratio is defined as the ratio of debt payment commitments (interest plus principal repayments) to 
profits before interest. Its key difference with the illiquidity ratio is that the latter takes into account the new flow of 
credit.   
10 In our simulations, the maximum bank leverage and the minimum capital adequacy ratio are determined based on 
the Basel III regulatory framework.  
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The bank leverage ratio is defined as:  
 
  BBGCB KHPMSECLLlev   (36) 
 
where BSEC  is the government securities that banks hold, HPM  is high-powered money and BK  
is the capital of banks. 
 
The capital adequacy ratio of banks is equal to:  
 
  BSGCLB SECwLLwKCAR   (37) 
 
where Lw  and Sw  are the risk weights on loans and securities respectively. 
 
We assume that when the bank leverage ratio becomes higher than its maximum value and/or the 
capital adequacy ratio falls below its minimum value, the government steps in and bailouts the 
banking sector in order to avoid a financial collapse. The bailout takes the form of a capital 
transfer. This means that it has a negative impact on the fiscal balance and the government 
acquires no financial assets as a result of its intervention. The bailout funds are equal to the 
amount that is necessary for the banking sector to restore the capital needed in order to comply 
with the regulatory requirements. 
 
2.7. Central banks and green QE 
 
Central banks determine the base interest rate, provide liquidity to commercial banks (via 
advances) and buy government securities (acting as residual purchasers). Moreover, in the context 
of QE programmes, they buy bonds issued by the firm sector. Currently, central banks do not 
explicitly distinguish between the holdings of conventional and green bonds. However, in order to 
analyse the implications of a green QE programme, we assume that central banks announce 
separately the amount of conventional bond and green bond purchases. The value of 
conventional corporate bonds held be central banks ( CCBB ) is: 
 
1 CCCCB BsB   (38) 
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where Cs  is the share of total outstanding conventional bonds that central banks desire to keep 
on their balance sheet. Currently, this share is very low since the corporate bond purchases of 
central banks represent a very small proportion of the total bond market. 
 
The central banks’ holdings of corporate green bonds ( GCBB ) are given by: 
 
1 GGGCB BsB   (39) 
 
where Gs  is the share of total outstanding green bonds that central banks desire to keep on their 
balance sheet. We assume that this share is currently equal to zero since central banks do not 
implement green QE programmes.  
 
3. Calibration, estimation and validation of the model  
 
We have calibrated and estimated the DEFINE 1.0 model employing global data. Parameter 
values (a) have been econometrically estimated using panel data, (b) have been directly calibrated 
using related data, previous studies or reasonable range of values, or (c) have been indirectly 
calibrated such that the model matches the initial values obtained from the data or generates the 
baseline scenario. The details are reported in Appendix B and Appendix C. 
 
The model is simulated for the period 2015-2115. The aim of the simulations is to illuminate the 
long-run trends in the interactions between the financial system and climate change. Hence, no 
explicit attention is paid to short-run fluctuations and business cycles. Since the model includes 
some stochastic processes, we perform 200 Monte Carlo simulations and we report the across-run 
averages.  
 
In the baseline scenario (see Table 5) we assume that the economy grows on average at a rate 
slightly lower than 2.7% till 2050; in other words, we postulate an economic expansion a little bit 
lower than the one observed over the last two decades or so. Drawing on the United Nations 
(2015) population projections (medium fertility variant), the population is assumed to grow at a 
declining rate, becoming equal to around 9.77bn people in 2050. The improvement in the 
ecological efficiency indicators is quite modest: for example, the share of renewable energy is 
increased to about 18% till 2050 (from about 14% which is the current level), while energy 
intensity is assumed to become approximately 25% lower in 2050 compared to its 2015 level. The 
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improvement in ecological efficiency is associated with the accumulation of green capital. The 
cumulative green investment from 2015 to 2050 equals around US$47tn. We also assume that in 
the baseline scenario the price index in the conventional bond market remains relatively stable till 
2050, while the green bond price index improves in the next decade or so as a result of an 
increasing demand for green bonds.  
 
Table 5: Baseline scenario 
Variable Value/trend
Economic growth till 2050 slightly lower than 2.7% (on average)
Unemployment rate till 2050 around 6% (on average)
Population in 2050 9.77bn
Labour force-to-population ratio in 2050 0.45
Share of renewable energy in total energy in 2050 around 18%
CO2 intensity in 2050 as a ratio of CO2 intensity in 2015 around 0.9
Material intensity in 2050 as a ratio of material intensity in 2015 around 0.9
Energy intensity in 2050 as a ratio of energy intensity in 2015 around 0.75
Recycling rate in 2050 as a ratio of recycling rate in 2015 around 1.4
Default rate till 2050 slightly higher than 4% (on average)
Cumulative green investment till 2050 around US$47tn
Cumulative conventional investment till 2050 around US$828tn
Price index of conventional bonds quite stable till around 2050
Price index of green bonds increases slightly in the next decade or so  
 
We do not expect that the structure of the time series data in the next decades will necessarily be 
the same with the structure of past times series. However, it is a useful exercise to compare the 
auto- and cross-correlation structure of our simulated data with the observed one in order to 
check whether the model produces data with reasonable time-series properties.11 This is done in 
Fig. 1. Figs. 1a-1d show the auto-correlation structure of the cyclical component of the simulated 
and observed time series for output, consumption, investment and employment up to 20 lags. 
Figs. 1e-1h show the correlation between the cyclical component of output at time t and of 
output, investment, consumption and employment at time t-lag. The series are expressed in logs 
and the HP filter has been used to isolate the cyclical component. The simulated data refer to the 
baseline scenario and capture only the period 2015-2050 in order to avoid the significant 
disturbances to the data structures that are caused by climate change after 2050, when the 2oC 
threshold is passed. 
 
 
                                                 
11 For similar validation exercises see Assenza et al. (2015) and Caiani et al. (2016).  
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Fig. 1: Auto-correlations and cross-correlations of observed and simulated data 
 
(a) Auto-correlation: output 
 
(c) Auto-correlation: consumption 
 
(e) Cross-correlation: output 
 
(g) Cross-correlation: consumption 
 
 
(b) Auto-correlation: investment 
 
(d) Auto-correlation: employment 
 
(f) Cross-correlation: investment 
 
(h) Cross-correlation: employment 
 
 
Note: The series are expressed in logs and the HP filter has been used to isolate the cyclical component. The data for the observed variables have been taken 
from World Bank. Real output is available for the period 1960-2016, real consumption and real investment are available for the period 1970-2015 and 
employment is available for the period 1991-2016. 
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The auto-correlation structure of our simulated data is similar to the auto-correlation structure of 
the observed data. This is especially the case for the structure of our simulated output which looks 
remarkably close to the empirically observed structure. Moreover, simulated investment, 
consumption and employment appear to be pro-cyclical, in tune with the empirical data, and their 
peak behaviour resembles the behaviour observed in the real data. These results suggest that our 
model generates data with empirically reasonable properties.    
 
4. Climate change and financial stability 
 
Fig. 2 summarises the main channels through which climate change and financial stability interact. 
Fig. 3 plots the simulation results. In the baseline scenario CO2 emissions increase significantly 
over the next decades (Fig. 3c). This rise is mainly driven both by the exponential increase in 
output due to positive economic growth (Fig. 3a) and the very slow improvement in energy 
efficiciency and the share of renewable energy in total energy (Fig 3b). Hence, CO2 concentration 
in the atmposphere increases, leading to severe global warming: as Fig. 3d indicates, in 2100 
temperature becomes about 4.2oC higher than the pre-industrial levels.12  
 
The rise in atmospheric temperature leads to climate change damages. Accordingly, the growth 
rate of output starts declining (Fig. 3a). This slowdown of economic activity becomes more 
intense after the mid of the 21st century when temperature passes 2oC. Declining economic 
growth and the desctruction of capital harms the profitability of firms (Fig. 3e) and deteriorates 
their liquidity, which in turn increases their rate of default (Fig. 3f) and thereby increases the bank 
leverage (Fig. 3g) and decreases the capital adequacy ratio.13 The overall result is an increase in 
credit rationing which feeds back into economic growth (Fig. 3a) and the profitability and liquidity 
of firms, giving rise to a vicious financial cycle. This also slows down the investment in green 
capital, disrupting the transition to a low-carbon and more ecologically efficient economy. 
Crucially, at some point in time the capital of banks becomes insufficient to cover the regulatory 
requirements. Thus, the government sector steps in and bailouts the banks with adverse effects on 
the public debt-to-output ratio (Fig. 3h).   
                                                 
12 This increase in temperature in our baseline scenario is broadly in line with the results of key integrated 
assesssment models (see Nordhaus, 2016). 
13 The impact of climate damages on bank leverage is in line with the empirical evidence reported in Klomp (2014) 
which shows that natural disasters deteriorate the financial robustness of banks.   
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Fig. 2: Channels through which climate change and financial stability interact in the model 
 
 
Climate damages also affect the liquidity preference of households. The destruction of capital and 
the decline in the profitability of firms induces a reallocation of household financial wealth from 
corporate bonds towards deposits and government securities, which are deemed much safer. This 
is shown in Fig. 3i. The result is a decline in the price of corporate conventional bonds in the last 
decades of our simulation period (Fig. 3j). This is an example of a climate-induced asset price 
deflation. The price of green corporate bonds also falls in our baseline scenario, after the increase 
in the first years (Fig. 3k). However, the main reason behind this fall is not the decline in the 
demand for green bonds from households. This fall is primarily explained by the increase in the 
supply of green bonds since desired green investment continuously increases in our simulation 
period (Fig. 3l).  
 
Bond price deflation has negative effects on economic growth because it reduces both the wealth-
related consumption and the ability of firms to rely on the bond market in order to fund their 
desired investment. It also leads to less green investment which affects adversely the improvement 
in ecological efficiency. 
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Fig. 3: Evolution of environmental, macroeconomic and financial variables, baseline scenario and sensitivity analysis 
 
(a) Growth rate of output 
 
(c) CO2 emissions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Share of renewable energy in total energy   
 
(d) Atmospheric temperature  
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(continued from the previous page) 
(e) Firms’ rate of profit 
 
(g) Banks’ leverage ratio 
 
 
 
(f) Default rate 
 
(h) Public debt-to-output ratio 
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(continued from the previous page) 
(i) Share of conventional bonds in households’ wealth 
 
(k) Green bonds price index 
 
 
 
(j) Conventional bonds price index 
 
(l) Share of desired green investment in total investment 
 
Note: The figure reports across-run averages from 200 Monte Carlo simulations. The values used in the simulations are reported in Appendix B and Appendix C (baseline scenario). The following parameters are modified in the sensitivity tests: '
10 , '20 , 
'
40 , 2def , 2r , 2l , 3r , 3l , 4r  and 4l . In Sensitivity Test I the values of these parameters are 50% higher compared to the baseline scenario. In Sensitivity Test II they are 50% lower. 
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How does the baseline scenario change when key parameters are modified? Space limitations do 
not allow us to explore this question in detail. However, we conduct a sensitivity analysis that 
concentrates on the key parameters that are related to the responsiveness of the financial system 
to climate damages: (i) the sensitivity of the default rate to the illiquidity ratio; (ii) the sensitivity of 
credit rationing to the debt service ratio of firms, bank leverage and capital adequacy ratio; (iii) the 
parameters of the portfolio choice that capture the sensitivity of the liquidity preference of 
households to the global warming damages. In Sensitivity Test I the values of these parameters 
are 50% higher compared to the baseline scenario. In Sensitivity Test II they are 50% lower.   
 
As expected, the default rate increases (decreases) more quickly when its sensitivity to the 
illiquidity ratio is higher (lower) compared to the baseline (Fig. 3f). The same holds for the bank 
leverage ratio (Fig. 3g). Also, the price of green corporate bonds declines more rapidly when the 
portfolio choice of households is more responsive to climate change damages (Fig 3k). Overall, 
the effects of climate change on financial stability are qualitatively similar but the parameter values 
affect the severity and the time horizon of the climate-induced financial instability.   
 
 
5. Effects of a green QE programme 
 
In this section we analyse how our results change when a green QE programme is implemented. 
We suppose that in 2020 central banks around the globe decide that they will purchase 25% of the 
outstanding green bonds and they commit themselves that they will keep the same share of the 
green bond market over the next decades. We also assume that the proportion of conventional 
corporate bonds held by central banks remains equal to its current level.14      
 
Experimentation with various parameter values has shown that the parameter that plays a key role 
in determining the effectiveness of a green QE programme is the sensitivity of the share of 
desired green investment to the divergence between the green bond yield and the conventional 
bond yield ( 2 ) – see Eq. (19). The higher the value of 2  the more firms’ green investment 
responds to a monetary policy-induced decline in the yield of green bonds. Consequently, in our 
                                                 
14 We find that the effects of a green QE programme do not differ significantly if we assume that central banks stop 
holding conventional corporate bonds.  
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simulations we consider a green QE scenario whereby 2  is equal to its baseline value and 
another green QE scenario in which a more optimistic value of 2  is assumed.   
 
The effects of the green QE programme are portrayed in Fig. 4. As Fig. 4k shows, green QE 
boosts the price of green corporate bonds. This has various positive implications for climate 
change and financial stability. Regarding climate change, the resulting reduction in the green bond 
yield leads to a lower cost of borrowing for firms and a lower reliance on bank lending. This 
increases overall investment, including green investment. More importantly, since the price of 
green bonds increases relative to the price of conventional bonds (Figs. 4j and 4k), the share of 
desired green investment in total investment goes up (Fig. 4l). As firms invest more in green 
capital, the use of renewable energy increases (Fig. 4b). This leads to lower CO2 emissions and 
slower global warming from what would otherwise be the case.  
 
It should, however, be pointed out that in our simulations green QE cannot by itself prevent a 
substantial rise in atmospheric temperature: even with the optimistic value of 2 , global warming 
is not significantly lower than 4oC at the end of the century. There are two key reasons for that. 
First, the interest rate is just one of the factors that affect green investment. Therefore, a decline 
in the green bond yield is not sufficient to bring about a substantial rise in green investment. 
Second, a higher 2  is conducive to lower damages, allowing economic activity to expand more 
rapidly in the optimistic green QE scenario (Fig. 4a). This higher economic activity places upward 
pressures on CO2 emissions (Fig. 4c).  
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Fig. 4: Effects of the implementation of a green QE programme 
 
(a) Growth rate of output 
 
(c) CO2 emissions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Share of renewable energy in total energy   
 
(d) Atmospheric temperature  
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(continued from the previous page) 
(e) Firms’ rate of profit 
 
(g) Banks’ leverage ratio 
 
 
 
(f) Default rate 
 
(h) Public debt-to-output ratio 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
(continued from the previous page) 
(i) Share of conventional bonds in households’ wealth 
 
(k) Green bonds price index 
 
 
 
(j) Conventional bonds price index 
 
(l) Share of desired green investment in total investment 
 
Note: The figure reports across-run averages from 200 Monte Carlo simulations. The values used in the simulations are reported in Appendix B and Appendix C (baseline scenario). In Green QE (baseline) the sensitivity of the desired green 
investment to the divergence between the green bond yield and the conventional bond yield (
2 ) is equal to 1. In Green QE (optimistic) we have that 52  . The implementation of Green QE starts in 2020. This is captured by an increase 
in 
Gs  from 0 to 0.25.  
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Regarding financial stability, green QE increases firm profitability and reduces the liquidity 
problems of firms. This makes the default rate and the bank leverage lower compared to the 
baseline (Figs. 4f and 4g); it also reduces the public debt-to-output ratio (Fig. 4h). These beneficial 
effects on financial stability stem from (i) the reduction in economic damages as a result of slower 
global warming and (ii) the lower reliance of firms’ green investment on bank lending. A higher 
value of 2  reinforces generally the financial stability effects of green QE. However, the rise in 
the price of green bonds is lower compared to the baseline green QE scenario (Fig. 4k). The 
reason is that firms issue more green bonds in order to fund their higher desired green 
investment. For a given demand for green bonds, this tends to reduce the bond price.    
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The fundamental changes that are expected to take place in the climate system in the next decades 
are likely to have severe implications for the stability of the financial system. The purpose of this 
article was to analyse these implications by using a stock-flow-fund ecological macroeconomic 
model. Emphasis was placed on the effects of climate change damages on the financial position 
of firms and asset price deflation. The model was estimated and calibrated using global data and 
simulations were conducted for the period 2015-2115.   
 
Our simulation analysis for the interactions between climate change and financial stability 
produced three key results. First, by destroying the capital of firms and reducing their profitability 
and liquidity, climate change is likely to increase rate of default of corporate loans that could harm 
the stability of the banking system. Second, the damages caused by climate change can lead to a 
portfolio reallocation that can cause a gradual decline in the price of corporate bonds. Third, 
financial instability might adversely affect credit expansion and the investment in green capital, 
with adverse feedback effects on climate change. The sensitivity analysis illustrated that these 
results do not change qualitatively when key parameter values are modified.  
 
The article also investigated how a green QE programme could reduce the risks imposed on the 
financial system by climate change. The simulation results showed that, by increasing the price of 
green corporate bonds, the implementation of a green QE programme can reduce climate-
induced financial instability and restrict global warming. However, green QE does not turn out to 
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be by itself capable of preventing a substantial reduction in atmospheric temperature. Even with 
an optimistic assumption about the sensitivity of green investment to the divergence between the 
green bond yield and the conventional bond yield, global warming is still severe. Hence, many 
other types of environmental policies and strategies need to be implemented in conjunction with a 
green QE programme in order to keep atmospheric temperature close to 2oC and prevent 
climate-induced financial instability.  
 
 33 
 
 
References 
 
Aglietta, M., Espagne, E., 2016. Climate and finance systemic risks, more than an analogy? The 
climate fragility hypothesis. CEPII Working Paper No. 2016-10. 
Alli Abbas, S.M., Blattner, L., De Broeck, M., El-Ganainy, A., Huet, M., 2014. Sovereign debt 
composition in advanced economies: a historical perspective. IMF Working Paper No. 14-162. 
Allianz, 2015. Global Wealth Report 2015. Allianz Economic Research, August. 
Anderson, V., 2015. Green Money: Reclaiming Quantitative Easing Money Creation for the 
Common Good. Green/EFA group in the European Parliament, June.  
Assenza, T., Delli Gatti, D., Grazzini, J., 2015. Emergent dynamics of a macroeconomic agent 
based model with capital and credit. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 50, 5-28. 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 2014. Bond Indices: Global High Grade Profiles. Bond Indices 
Global, September.  
Barkawi, A., Monnin, P., 2015. Monetary policy and sustainability: the case of Bangladesh. CEP 
Discussion Note No. 2015/1.  
Barker, T., Dagoumas, A., Rubin, J., 2009. The macroeconomic rebound effect and the world 
economy. Energy Efficiency, 2, 411-427. 
Batten, S., Sowerbutts, R., Tanaka, M., 2016. Let’s talk about the weather: the impact of climate 
change on central banks. Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 603. 
Battiston, S., Mandel, A., Monasterolo, I., Schütze, F., Visentin, G., 2017. A climate stress-test of 
the financial system. Nature Climate Change, 7, 283-288. 
BCBS, 2006. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A 
Revised Framework Comprehensive Version. Bank for International Settlements, June. 
BGR, 2015. Energy Study 2015: Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources. 
Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR). 
Blecker, R., 2002. Distribution, demand and growth in neo-Kaleckian macro-models, in: 
Setterfield, M. (ed.), The Economics of Demand-led Growth: Challenging the Supply-Side 
Vision of the Long Run, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA. 
Caiani, A., Godin, A., Caverzasi, E., Gallegati, M., Kinsella, S., Stiglitz, J.E., 2016. Agent based-
stock flow consistent macroeconomics: towards a benchmark model. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 69, 375-408. 
 34 
 
 
Campiglio, E., 2016. Beyond carbon pricing: the role of banking and monetary policy in financing 
the transition to a low-carbon economy. Ecological Economics, 121, 220-230. 
Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011. Unburnable Carbon: Are the World’s Financial Markets Carrying 
a Carbon Bubble? London: Investor Watch.  
Climate Bonds Initiative, 2016. Bonds and Climate Change: The State of the Market in 2016. 
Climate Bonds Initiative in association with HSBC Climate Change Centre of Excellence, July. 
Dafermos, Y., Nikolaidi, M., Galanis, G., 2017. A stock-flow-fund ecological macroeconomic 
model. Ecological Economics, 131, 191-207. 
Dietz, S., Bowen, A., Dixon, C., Gradwell, P., 2016. ‘Climate value at risk’ of global financial 
assets. Nature Climate Change, 6, 676–679.  
EEA, 2012. Material resources and waste – 2012 update: the European environment state and 
outlook 2010. EEA, Copenhagen. 
FTSE Russell, 2016. FTSE Global Bond Index Series. 
Georgescu-Roegen, N., 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Georgescu-Roegen, N., 1979. Energy analysis and economic valuation. Southern Economic 
Journal, 45 (4), 1023-1058. 
Georgescu-Roegen, N., 1984. Feasible recipes versus viable technologies. Atlantic Economic 
Journal, 12 (1), 21-31. 
Godley, W., 1999. Money and credit in a Keynesian model of income determination. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 23 (2), 393-411.  
Godley, W., Lavoie, M., 2007. Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, 
Income, Production and Wealth. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK. 
Haas, W., Krausmann, F., Wiedenhofer, D., Heinz, M., 2015. How circular is the global economy? 
An assessment of material flows, waste production, and recycling in the European Union and 
the world in 2005. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 19 (5), 765–777. 
IEA, 2016. World Energy Outlook 2016, International Energy Agency. 
Jakab, J., Kumhof, M., 2015. Banks are not intermediaries of loanable funds – and why this 
matters. Bank of England Working Paper No. 529. 
Johnson, V., 2012. Unburnable Carbon: Rational Investment for Sustainability. The New 
Economics Foundation, London, UK. 
Kaldor, N., 1940. A model of the trade cycle. Economic Journal, 50 (197), 78-92. 
 35 
 
 
Klomp, J., 2014. Financial fragility and natural disasters: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial 
Stability. 13 (2014), 180-192. 
Lamperti, F., Dosi, G., Napoletano, M., Roventini, A., Sapio, A., 2017. Faraway, So Close: 
Coupled Climate and Economic Dynamics in an Agent-Based Integrated Assessment Model. 
LEM Working Paper Series. 
Lown, C., Morgan, D.P., 2006. The credit cycle and the business cycle: new findings using the 
loan officer opinion survey. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 38 (6), 1575-1597. 
Monasterolo, I., Raberto, M., 2018. The EIRIN flow-of-funds behavioural model of green fiscal 
policies and green sovereign bonds. Ecological Economics, 144, 228-243. 
Matikainen, S., Campiglio, E., Zenghelis, D., 2017. The climate impact of quantitative easing. 
Policy Paper, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London 
School of Economics and Political Science. 
Murphy, R., Hines, C., 2010. Green Quantitative Easing: Paying for the Economy we Need. 
Finance for the Future, Norfolk, December. 
Nordhaus, W., 2016. Projections and uncertainties about climate change in an era of minimal 
climate policies. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2057. 
OECD, 2015. Green Bonds Mobilising the Debt Capital Markets for a Low-carbon Transition. 
Policy Perspectives, December. 
Plantinga, A., Scholtens, B., 2016. The financial impact of divestment from fossil fuels. 16005-
EEF, University of Groningen. 
Rozenberg, J., Hallegatte, S., Perrissin-Fabert, B., Hourcade, J.-C., 2013. Funding low-carbon 
investments in the absence of a carbon tax. Climate Policy, 13 (1), 134-141. 
Scott, M., van Huizen, J., Jung, C., 2017. The Bank of England’s response to climate change. 
Quarterly Bulletin 2017 Q2, Bank of England. 
Skidmore, M., 2001. Risk, natural disasters, and household savings in a life cycle model. Japan and 
the World Economy, 13 (2001), 15-34. 
Skott, P., Zipperer, B., 2012. An empirical evaluation of three post-Keynesian models. European 
Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, 9 (2), 277-308. 
United Nations, 2015. World Population Prospects: Key Findings and Advance Tables, United 
Nations, New York. 
UN Environment Inquiry, 2017. On the Role of Central Banks in Enhancing Green Finance. UN 
Environment Inquiry into the design of a sustainable financial system, Geneva.  
 36 
 
 
Werner, R., 2012. Replace bond purchases with solar PV purchases. University of Southampton 
Management School, Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development, Policy News, 
3 (1), February.  
Weitzman, M.L., 2012. GHG targets as insurance against catastrophic climate damages. Journal of 
Public Economic Theory, 14 (2), 221-244. 
 37 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
3.1 Ecosystem  
 
3.1.1 Matter, recycling and waste 
 
YMY   (A1) 
RECMYM   (A2) 
DEMREC   (A3) 
 11   DCKDEM   (A4) 
DEMMYSESSES  1  (A5) 
SESEMISOCENMW IN  2  (A6) 
car
EMIS
CEN
IN
  (A7) 
CENEMISO IN 2  (A8) 
hazWHWSHWS  1  (A9) 
POP
HWS
hazrario   (A10) 
MCONREVREV MMM  1  (A11) 
1 MMM RESconCON  (A12) 
MMM CONRESRES  1  (A13) 
1

M
M
REV
M
dep  (A14) 
 
3.1.2 Energy 
 
YE   (A15) 
EER   (A16) 
EREEN   (A17) 
ERENED   (A18) 
ENCONREVREV EEE  1  (A19) 
1 EEE RESconCON  (A20) 
EEE CONRESRES  1  (A21) 
1

E
E
REV
EN
dep  (A22) 
 
3.1.3 Emissions and climate change 
 
ENEMISIN   (A23) 
 lrEMISEMIS LL   11  (A24) 
LIN EMISEMISEMIS   (A25) 
121111 222   UPATAT COCOEMISCO   (A26) 
132122112 2222   LOUPATUP COCOCOCO   (A27) 
133123 222   LOUPLO COCOCO   (A28) 
EX
PREAT
AT
CO F
CO
CO
logFF 


2
2
222  (A29) 
fexFF EXEX  1  (A30) 
 38 
 
 
 





 

 1121
22
11 LOATAT
CO
ATAT TTtT
S
F
FtTT  (A31) 
 1131   LOATLOLO TTtTT  (A32) 
 
3.1.4 Ecological efficiency and technology 
 
  g  11  (A33) 
 11 1   gg  (A34) 
 CG KK
minmax
max
e 211





  (A35) 
 CG KK
max
e 431




  (A36) 
 CG KK
minmax
max
e 651





  (Α37) 
 CG KKe 871
1



  (A38) 
 
 
3.2 Macroeconomy and financial system 
 
3.2.1 Output determination and damages 
 

RECREV
Y
M
*
M


1  (A39) 
 


1
1E
*
E
REV
Y  (A40) 
vKYK 
*  (A41) 
hLFY*N   (A42) 
 *N*K*E*M* Y,Y,Y,YminY   (A43) 
GICY   (A44) 
*
MY
Y
um   (A45) 
*
EY
Y
ue   (A46) 
*
KY
Y
u   (A47) 
*
NY
Y
re   (A48) 
7546
3
2
211
1
1
.
ATATAT
T
TTT
D
 
  (A49) 
TTP pDD   (A50) 
TP
T
TF
D
D
D



1
1
1  (A51) 
 
3.2.2 Firms 
 
11111 intint   GGCCGGCCG bcouponbcouponKLLwNYTP   (A52) 
 39 
 
 
FG TTPTP   (A53) 
1 TPsRP F  (A54) 
RPTPDP   (A55) 
KRPr   (A56) 
    
 1111
16115114113121101
00 1
50501 625242

















 TI
D DKKK
um.ue.urgruexp
I 




 (A57) 
DD
G II   (A58) 
D
G
DD
C III   (A59) 
      131111210 1   TCGLCGL Dyieldyieldshintintsh   (A60) 
)1( 0100  g   (A61) 
 2100 1   gg  (A62) 
GGGG
D
G
D
G bpKrepLRPINL    11  (A63) 
  CCCCDCDC bpKrepLRPINL    111  (A64) 
11   GGGGGG defLbpKLRPI   (A65) 
DLbpbpIKLLRPI CCGGGGCC    1  (A66) 
GC III   (A67) 
GC LLL   (A68) 
11   GGGG KIKK   (A69) 
11   CCCC KIKK   (A70) 
GC KKK   (A71) 
K/KG  (A72) 
   100 11  TFK Dad  (A73) 
  11 11   TPP Dadvv  (A74) 
1210  Ygg   (A75) 
 3100 1     (A76) 
    11 111   TPP Dadg  (A77) 
hsw W  (A78) 
h
Y
N   (A79) 
reur 1  (A80) 
C
D
C
CC
p
Ix
bb
1
1    (A81) 
G
D
G
GG
p
Ix
bb
2
1    (A82) 
111101  Cyieldxxx  (A83) 
121202  Gyieldxxx  (A84) 
 2012020 1 xgxx    (A85) 
 412020 1  xx gg  (A86) 
C
C
C
p
coupon
yield   (A87) 
G
G
G
p
coupon
yield   (A88) 
CCBCHC BBB   (A89) 
GCBGHG BBB   (A90) 
 40 
 
 
C
C
C
b
B
p   (A91) 
G
G
G
b
B
p   (A92) 
GC BBB   (A93) 
1 defLDL  (A94) 
 12101 

illiqdefdefexpdef
def
def
max
 (A95) 
   
    GGCCDGGDCC
FGGCCGGCC
bpbpNLCRNLCRY
KTwNbcouponbcouponLrepintLrepint
illiq






11
11111  (A96) 
   
    1111
1111





GGCCGGCC
GGCCGGCC
bcouponbcouponLrepintLrepintTP
bcouponbcouponLrepintLrepint
dsr  (A97) 
 
2.2 Households 
 
1111   GHGCHCHSDDHG bcouponbcouponSECintDintBPDPwNY  (A98) 
HHGH TYY   (A99) 
  11211 1   THFH DVcYcC   (A100) 
GGHCCHHHFHF pbpbCYVV  111    (A101) 
1
1
15141131121111010
1 




HF
H
DGCST
HF
H
V
Y
intyieldyieldintD'
V
SEC
  (A102) 
1
1
25241231222112020
1 




HF
H
DGCST
HF
CH
V
Y
intyieldyieldintD'
V
B
  (A103) 
1
1
35341331323113030
1 




HF
H
DGCST
HF
GH
V
Y
intyieldyieldintD'
V
B
  (A104) 
1
1
45441431424114040
1 




HF
H
DGCST
HF V
Y
intyieldyieldintD'
V
D
  (A105n) 
GHGCHCHH bpbpSECCYDD   1  (A105) 
 3013030 1  g   (A106) 
 413030 1   gg  (A107) 
C
CH
CH
p
B
b   (A108) 
G
GH
GH
p
B
b   (A109) 
11   DCCDCDC   (A110) 
 51 1  POPPOP gg  (A111) 
 POPgPOPPOP   11  (A112) 
    POPDadhazratiolflfLF TFLF 1121 11    (A113) 
 6111 1  lflf  (A114) 
 
2.3 Banks 
 
11111   AintDintSECintLintLintBP ADBSGGCC  (A115) 
BAILOUTDLBPKK UBB  1  (A116) 
1 BPsBP BU  (A117) 
UD BPBPBP   (A118) 
 41 
 
 
DhHPM 1  (A119) 
DhSECB 2  (A120) 
BAILOUTBPDDLSECLLHPMAA UBCG   1  (A121) 
     CRminmaxBB
max
C
CARCARrlevlevrdsrrrexpr
CR
CR 


 141312101
 (A122) 
     CRminmaxBB
max
G
CARCARllevlevldsrllexpl
CR
CR 


 141312101
 (A123) 
  111 1   CC
D
CCCC defLrepLNLCRLL  (A124) 
  111 1   GG
D
GGGG defLrepLNLCRLL  (A125) 
  BBGCB KHPMSECLLlev   (A126) 
  BSGCLB SECwLLwKCAR   (A127) 
 
2.4 Government sector 
 
BAILOUTCBPSECintTGSECSEC S   11  (A128) 
1 govYG  (A129) 
1 GHHT   (A130) 
1 GFF TPT   (A131) 
FH TTT   (A132) 
 
2.5 Central banks 
 
1111 intint   CBSAGCBGCCBC SECAbcouponbcouponCBP  (A133) 
1 GGGCB BsB   (A134) 
1 CCCCB BsB  (A135) 
C
CCB
CCB
p
B
b   (A136) 
G
GCB
GCB
p
B
b    (A137) 
BHCB SECSECSECSEC    (A138) 
GGBGCCBCCBCB bpbpAHPMSECSEC   1   (A139-red) 
 42 
 
 
Appendix B. Initial values for endogenous variables 
 
Symbol Description Value Remarks/sources
A Advances (trillion US$) 6.5 Calculated from the identity K B =L C +L G +HPM+SEC B -A -D  using the initial 
values of K B , L C , L G , HPM , SEC B  and D
B
Value of total corporate bonds (trillion US$) 12.0 Based on OECD (2015, p. 3); we use the figure for the debt securities issued by 
non-financial corporations
BAILOUT Bailout funds provided to the banking system from the government sector 0 No bailout is assumed in 2015 since lev B <lev B
max
  and CAR>CAR
min
BC Value of conventional corporate bonds (trillion US$) 11.7 Calculated from Eq. (A93) using the initial values of B  and BG
b C Number of conventional bonds (trillions) 0.117 Calculated from Eq. (A91) using the initial values of p C and BC
BCCB Value of conventional corporate bonds held by central banks (trillion US$) 0.1 Based on the recent holdings of central banks as part of their corporate sector 
purchase programmes
b CCB Number of conventional corporate bonds held by central banks (trillions) 0.001 Calculated from Eq. (A136) using the initial values of p C and B CCB
BCH Value of conventional corporate bonds held by households (trillion US$) 11.6 Calculated from Eq. (A89) using the initial values of BCCB and B C
b CH Number of conventional corporate bonds held by households (trillions) 0.1 Calculated from Eq. (A108) using the initial values of p C and B CH
BG Value of green corporate bonds (trillion US$) 0.3 Based on Climate Bonds Initiative (2016); we estimate the value of bonds held by 
the non-financial corporate sector using the outstanding value of both labelled and 
unlabelled green/climate-alligned bonds 
b G Number of green corporate bonds (trillions) 0.003 Calculated from Eq. (A92) using the initial values of p G and BG
BGCB Value of green corporate bonds held by central banks (trillion US$) 0 There was no green QE programme in 2015
b GCB Number of green corporate bonds held by central banks (trillions) 0 Calculated from Eq. (A137) using the initial values of p G and B GCB
BGH Value of green corporate bonds held by households (trillion US$) 0.30 Calculated from Eq. (A90) using the initial values of BG and BGCB
b GH Number of green corporate bonds held by households (trillions) 0.0030 Calculated from Eq. (A109) using the initial values of p G and B GH
BP Profits of banks (trillion US$) 2.84 Calculated from Eq. (A115) using the initial values of L C , L G , SEC B , D and A
BP D Distributed profits of banks (trillion US$) 0.48 Calculated from Eq. (A118) using the initial values of BP and BP U
BP U Retained profits of banks (trillion US$) 2.37 Calculated from Eq. (A117) using the initial value of BP
C Consumption (trillion US$) 48.0 Calculated from Eq. (A44) using the initial values of Y , G and I
CAR Capital adequacy ratio 0.1 Calculated from Eq. (A127) using the initial values of K B , L C , L G  and SEC B
CBP Central banks' profits (trillion US$) 0.2 Calculated from Eq. (A133) using the initial values of b CCB , b GCB , A and SEC CB
CEN Carbon mass of the non-renewable energy sources (Gt) 9.9 Calculated from Eq. (A7) using the initial value of EMIS IN 
CO2 AT Atmospheric CO2 concentration (Gt) 3120 Taken from NOAA/ESRL (National Oceanic & Atmospheric 
Administration/Earth System Research Laboratory)
CO2 LO Lower ocean CO2 concentration (Gt) 1686.8
Based on the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); Gt of carbon have been 
transformed into Gt of CO2
CO2 UP Upper ocean/biosphere CO2 concentration (Gt) 6380.6
Based on the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); Gt of carbon have been 
transformed into Gt of CO2
CON E Amount of non-renewable energy resources converted into non-renewable 
energy reserves (EJ)
1626.0 Calculated from Eq. (A20) using the initial value of RES E 
CON M Amount of material resources converted into material reserves (Gt) 194 Calculated from Eq. (A12) using the initial value of RES M
CR C Degree of credit rationing for conventional loans 0.2 Calculated from Eq. (A122) using the initial values of dsr , lev B and CAR
CR G Degree of credit rationing for green loans 0.3 Calculated from Eq. (A123) using the initial values of dsr , lev B and CAR
D Deposits (trillion US$) 66.0 Based on Allianz (2015)
DC Stock of durable consumption goods (trillion US$) 1256 Calculated from Eq. (A4) using the initial values of K , DEM , δ  and μ
def Rate of default 0.040 Based on World Bank
DEM Demolished/discarded socio-economic stock (Gt) 17.0 Based on Haas et al. (2015)
dep E Energy depletion ratio 0.013 Calculated from Eq. (A22) using the initial values of EN  and REV E
dep M Matter depletion ratio 0.008 Selected from a reasonable range of values
DL Amount of defaulted loans (trillion US$) 2.2 Calculated from Eq. (A94) using the initial values of L and def
DP Distributed profits of firms (trillion US$) 17.2 Calculated from Eq. (A55) using the initial values of TP  and RP
dsr Debt service ratio 0.41 Calculated from Eq. (A97) using the initial values of L C , L G , b C , b G , TP , p C and 
p G
D T Total proportional damage caused by global warming 0.0028 Calculated from Eq. (A49) using the initial value of T AT
D TF Part of damage that affects directly the fund-service resources 0.0026 Calculated from Eq. (A51) using the initial values of D T and D TP
D TP Part of damage that reduces the productivities of fund-service resources 0.0003 Calculated from Eq. (A50) using the initial value of D T
E Energy used for the production of output (EJ) 580.0 Based on IEA (International Energy Agency); total primary energy supply is used
ED Dissipated energy (EJ) 580.0 Calculated from Eq. (A18) using the initial values of EN and ER
EMIS Total CO2 emissions (Gt) 38.9 Calculated from Eq. (A25) using the initial values of EMIS IN  and EMIS L
EMIS IN Industrial CO2 emissions (Gt) 36.3 Taken from CDIAC (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center)
EMIS L Land-use CO2 emissions (Gt) 2.6 Taken from the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016)
EN Energy produced from non-renewable sources (EJ) 498.8 Calculated from Eq. (A17) using the initial values of E and ER
ER Energy produced from renewable sources (EJ) 81.2 Calculated from Eq. (A16) using the initial values of θ and E
F Radiative forcing over pre-industrial levels (W/m
2
) 2.46 Calculated from Eq. (A29) using the initial values of CO2 AT and F EX
F EX Radiative forcing, over pre-industrial levels, due to non-CO2 greenhouse gases 
(W/m
2
)
0.50 Based on the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016)
G Government expenditures (trillion US$) 11.6 Calculated from Eq. (A129) using the initial value of Y
g POP Growth rate of population 0.012 Taken from United Nations (medium fertility variant)
g x20 Growth rate of the autonomous proportion of desired green investment 
funded via bonds
0.040 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
g β0 Growth rate of the autonomous share of green investment in total investment 0.004 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario  
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Symbol Description Value Remarks/sources
g λ Growth rate of labour productivity 0.016 Calculated from Eq. (A75) using the initial values of g Y  and σ 0
g λ30 Growth rate of the households' portoflio choice parameter related to the 
autonomous demand for green bonds
0.040 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
g ω Growth rate of CO2 intensity -0.005 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
hazratio Hazardous waste accumulation ratio (tonnes per person) 1.90 Calculated from Eq. (A10) using the initial values of HWS and POP
HPM High-powered money 13.20 Calculated from Eq. (A119) using the initial value of D
HWS Stock of hazardous waste (Gt) 14.0 Calculated assuming a constant ratio of hazardous waste to GDP since 1960
I Total investment (trillion US$) 14.6 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
I C Conventional investment (trillion US$) 13.9 Calculated from Eq. (A67) using the initial values of I  and I G
I C
D Desired conventional investment (trillion US$) 16.1 Calculated from the identity I C
D
=I
D
-I G
D
; we use the initial values of I
D
 and I G
D
I
D Desired total investment (trillion US$) 17.0 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
I G Green investment (trillion US$) 0.7 Based on IEA (2016); we use a higher value than the one reported in IEA (2016) 
since green investment in our model  is not confined to investment in energy 
efficiency and renewables (it also includes investment in recyclicing and material 
efficiency)
I G
D Desired green investment (trillion US$) 0.9 Calculated such that it is reasonably higher than I G
illiq Illiquidity ratio 0.72 Calculated from Eq. (A96) using the initial values of L C , L G , b C , b G , w , N , T F , δ , 
K , Y , CR C , NL C
D
, CR G , NL G
D
, p C and p G
K Total capital stock of firms (trillion US$) 222.6 Calculated from the identity K =(K /Y )*Y using the initial value of Y and assuming 
that K/Y =3 (based on Penn World Table 9.0)
K B Capital of banks (trillion US$) 8.0 Calculated from Eq. (A126) using the initial values of lev B , L C , L G , SEC B  and 
HPM
K C Conventional capital stock (trillion US$) 214.2 Calculated from Eq. (A71) using the initial values of K  and K G
K G Green capital stock (trillion US$) 8.4 Calculated from Eq. (A72) using the initial values of K  and κ
L Total loans of firms (trillion US$) 55.4 Calculated from the identity L =(credit -B/Y )*Y; credit is the credit to the non-
financial corporations in percent of GDP taken from BIS (Bank for International 
Settlements); it is assumed that credit  includes both loans and bonds
L C Conventional loans (trillion US$) 53.3 Calculated from Eq. (A68) using the initial values of L  and L G
L G Green loans (trillion US$) 2.1 Calculated by assuming that L G /L=K G /K=κ ; we use the initial values of κ  and L
lev B Banks' leverage ratio 10.0 Taken from World Bank
LF Labour force (billion people) 3.40 Taken from World Bank 
lf 1
Autonomous labour force-to-population ratio 0.465 Calculated from Eq. (A113) using the initial values of LF , POP , hazratio  and D TF
M Extraction of new matter from the ground, excluding the matter included in 
non-renewable energy sources (Gt)
48.0 Based on the data provided by www.materialflows.net; the figure includes industrial 
and construction minerals plus ores
MY Output in material terms (Gt) 53.1 Calculated from Eq. (A2) using the initial values of M  and REC
N Number of employees (billion people) 3.2 Calculated from the definition of the rate of employment (re=N/LF ) using the 
initial values of re  and LF
NL C
D Desired new amount of conventional loans (trillion US$) 10.7 Calculated from Eq. (A64) using the initial values of I C
D
, β , RP , L C , δ,  K C , p C , 
and b C
NL G
D Desired new amount of green loans (trillion US$) 0.7 Calculated from Eq. (A63) using the initial values of I G
D
, β , RP , L G , δ,  K G , p G 
and b G
O2 Oxygen used for the combustion of fossil fuels (Gt) 26.4 Calculated from Eq. (A8) using the initial values of EMIS IN  and CEN
p C Price of conventional corporate bonds (US$) 100 The price has been normalised such that it is equal to 100 in 2015
p G Price of green corporate bonds (US$) 100 The price has been normalised such that it is equal to 100 in 2015
POP Population (billions) 7.35 Taken from United Nations (medium fertility variant)
r Rate of retained profits 0.009 Calculated from Eq. (A56) using the initial values of RP  and K 
re Rate of employment 0.94 Calculated from Eq. (A80) using the initial value of ur
REC Recycled socio-economic stock (Gt) 5.1 Calculated from Eq. (A3) using the initial values of ρ and DEM
RES E Non-renewable energy resources (EJ) 542000 Based on BGR (2015, p. 33)
RES M Material resources (Gt) 388889 Calculated by assuming  RES M /REV M =64.8 (based on UNEP, 2011)
REV E Non-renewable energy reserves (EJ) 37000 Based on BGR (2015, p. 33)
REV M Material reserves (Gt) 6000 Calculated from Eq. (A14) using the initial values of M and dep M
RP Retained profits of firms (trillion US$) 2.0 Calculated from Eq. (A54) using the initial value of TP
SEC Total amount of government securities 59.8 Calculated from the identity general government debt-to-GDP =SEC/Y  using the initial 
value of Y and the value of the general government debt-to-GDP  ratio (taken from 
IMF)
SEC B Government securities held by banks (trillion US$) 12.0 Calculated by assuming that SEC B /SEC=0.2 based on Alli Abbas et al. (2014)
SEC CB Government securities held by central banks (trillion US$) 6.6 Calculated from the identity SEC CB =HPM+V CB -p C b CCB -p G b GCB -A  using the 
initial values of V CB , p C , b CCB , p G , b GCB , A  and HPM
SEC H Government securities held by households (trillion US$) 41.3 Calculated from Eq. (A138) using the initial values of SEC, SEC CB  and SEC B
SES Socio-economic stock (Gt) 1058.5 Calculated from the identity SES =μ (K +DC ) using the initial values of μ , K  and 
DC
sh L Share of loans in total firm liabilities 0.82 Calculated from the formula sh L =L /(L +B ) using the initial values of L  and B
T Total taxes (trillion US$) 10.5 Calculated from Eq. (A132) using the initial values of T H  and T F  
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Symbol Description Value Remarks/sources
T AT Atmospheric temperature over pre-industrial levels (
o
C) 1.0 Based on Met Office
T F Taxes on firms' profits (trillion US$) 3.3 Calculated from Eq. (A131) using the initial value of TP G
T H Taxes on households' disposable income 7.2 Calculated from Eq. (A130) using the initial value Y H
T LO Lower ocean temperature over pre-industrial levels (
o
C) 0.0068 Taken from the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016)
TP Total profits of firms (trillion US$) 19.2 Calculated from Eq. (A53) using the initial values of TP G  and T F
TP G Total gross profits of firms (trillion US$) 22.5 Calculated from Eq. (A52) using the initial values of Y , w , N , L C , L G , δ,  K, b C 
and b G
u Rate of capacity utilisation 0.72 Based on World Bank, Enterprise Surveys
ue Rate of energy utilisation 0.01 Calculated from Eq. (A46) using the initial values of Y and Y E
*
um Rate of matter utilisation 0.01 Calculated from Eq. (A45) using the initial values of Y and Y M
*
ur Unemployment rate 0.06 Based on World Bank
v Capital productivity 0.46 Calculated from Eqs. (A41) and (A47) using the initial values of Y , u  and K
V CB Wealth of central banks (trillion US$) 0 It is assumed that there are no accumulated capital gains for the central banks
V HF Financial wealth of households (trillion US$) 119.2 Calculated from the identity V HF =D +p C b CH +p G b GH +SEC H  using the initial 
values of SEC H , p C , b CH , p G , b GH  and D
w Annual wage rate (trillion US$/billions of employees) 12.07 Calculated from Eq. (A78) using the initial value of λ
W Waste (Gt) 11.90 Calculated from the identity W=DEM -REC  using the initial values of DEM  and 
REC
x 1 Proportion of desired conventional investment funded via bonds 0.02 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
x 2 Proportion of desired green investment funded via bonds 0.01 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
x 20 Autonomous proportion of desired green investment funded via bonds 0.01 Calculated from Eq. (A84) using the initial values of yield G and x 2
Y Output (trillion US$) 74.2 Taken from IMF, World Economic Outlook (current prices)
Y
* Potential output (trillion US$) 78.9 Calculated from Eq. (A43) using the initial values of Y M
*
, Y E
*
, Y K
*
 and Y N
*
Y E
* Energy-determined potential output (trillion US$) 5504.0 Calculated from Eq. (A40) using the initial values of REV E , θ  and ε
Y H Disposable income of households (trillion US$) 51.1 Calculated from Eq. (A99) using the initial values of Y HG  and T H
Y HG Gross disposable income of households (trillion US$) 58.3
Calculated from Eq. (A98) using the initial values of w , N , DP , BP D ,  D, SEC H , 
b CH  and b GH
yield C Yield on conventional corporate bonds 0.05 Based on FTSE Russell (2016)
yield G Yield on green corporate bonds 0.05 Based on FTSE Russell (2016)
Y K
* Capital-determined potential output (trillion US$) 103.1 Calculated from Eq. (A41) using the initial values of v  and Κ
Y M
* Matter-determined potential output (trillion US$) 8391.3 Calculated from Eq. (A39) using the initial values of REV M , REC  and μ
Y N
* Labour-determined potential output (trillion US$) 78.9 Calculated from Eq. (A42) using the initial values of λ and LF
β Share of desired green investment in total investment 0.05 Calculated from Eq. (58) using the initial values of I G
D
 and I
D
β 0 Autonomous share of desired green investment in total investment 0.05 Calculated from Eq. (60) using the initial values of β , sh L , yield G , yield C  and D T
δ Depreciation rate of capital stock 0.04 Calculated from Eq. (A73) using the initial value D TF
ε Energy intensity (EJ/trillion US$) 7.82 Calculated from the definition of energy intensity (ε=Ε/Y ) using the initial values of 
Ε  and Y
θ Share of renewable energy in total energy 0.14 Based on IEA (International Energy Agency); total primary energy supply is used
κ Ratio of green capital to total capital 0.04 Selected such that it is reasonably lower than I G /I
λ Hourly labour productivity (trillion US$/(billions of employees*annual hours 
worked per employee))
0.01 Calculated from Eq. (A79) using the initial values of Y and N
λ30 Households' portoflio choice parameter related to the autonomous demand 
for green bonds
0.01 Calculated from Eq. (A104) using the initial values of BGH , V HF , D T , yield C , yield G 
and Y H
μ Material intensity (kg/$) 0.72 Calculated from the definition of material intensity (μ =MY /Y ) using the initial 
values of MY and Y
ρ Recycling rate 0.30 Based on Haas et al. (2015)
σ 0 Autonomous growth rate of labour productivity -0.02 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
ω CO2 intensity (Gt/EJ) 0.07 Calculated from Eq. (A23) using the initial values of EMIS IN  and EN  
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Symbol Description Value Remarks/sources
ad K Fraction of gross damages to capital stock avoided through adaptation 0.80 Selected from a reasonable range of values
ad LF Fraction of gross damages to labour force avoided through adaptation 0.70 Selected from a reasonable range of values
ad P Fraction of gross damages to productivity avoided through adaptation 0.90 Selected from a reasonable range of values
c 1 Propensity to consume out of disposable income 0.73 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
c 2 Propensity to consume out of financial wealth 0.10 Empirically estimated using data for a panel of countries (the econometric 
estimations are available upon request)
car Coefficient for the conversion of Gt of carbon into Gt of CO2 3.67 Taken from CDIAC (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center)
CAR
min Minimum capital adequacy ratio 0.08 Based on the Basel III regulatory framework
CO2 AT-PRE Pre-industrial CO2 concentration in atmosphere (Gt) 2156.2
Taken from DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); Gt of carbon have been 
transformed into Gt of CO2
CO2 LO-PRE Pre-industrial CO2 concentration in upper ocean/biosphere (Gt) 6307.2
Taken from DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); Gt of carbon have been 
transformed into Gt of CO2
CO2 UP-PRE Pre-industrial CO2 concentration in lower ocean (Gt) 1320.1
Taken from DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); Gt of carbon have been 
transformed into Gt of CO2
con Ε Conversion rate of non-renewable energy resources into reserves 0.003 Selected from a reasonable range of values
con M Conversion rate of material resources into reserves 0.0005 Selected from a reasonable range of values
coupon C Fixed coupon paid per conventional corporate bond (US$) 5 Calculated from Eq. (A87) using the initial values of p C and yield C
coupon G Fixed coupon paid per green corporate bond (US$) 5 Calculated from Eq. (A88) using the initial values of p G and yield G
CR
max Maximum degree of credit rationing 0.5 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
def
max Maximum default rate of loans 0.2 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
def 0 Parameter of the default rate function 4.00 Calculated from Eq. (A95) using the initial value of illiq 
def 1 Parameter of the default rate function 5.65 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
def 2 Parameter of the default rate function (related to the sensitivity of the default 
rate to the illiquidity ratio of firms)
7.81 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
F 2xCO2
Increase in radiative forcing (since the pre-industrial period) due to doubling of 
CO2 concentration from pre-industrial levels (W/m
2
)
3.7 Taken from the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016)
fex Annual increase in radiative forcing (since the pre-industrial period) due to non-
CO2 agents (W/m
2
)
0.006 Based on the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016)
gov Share of government expenditures in output 0.16 Based on World Bank; the figure includes only the consumption government 
expenditures
h Annual working hours per employee 1800 Based on Penn World Table 9.0
h 1 Banks' reserve ratio 0.2 Based on World Bank
h 2 Banks' government securities-to-deposits ratio 0.18 Calculated from Eq. (A120) using the initial values of SEC B  and D
haz Proportion of hazardous waste in total waste 0.04 EEA (2012, p. 22) reports a figure equal to 3.7% for EU-27
int A Interest rate on advances 0.02 Based on Global Interest Rate Monitor
int C Interest rate on conventional loans 0.07 Based on World Bank
int D Interest rate on deposits 0.015 Based on World Bank
int G Interest rate on green loans 0.08 Based on World Bank; it is assumed that int G -int C =0.01
int S Interest rate on government securities 0.012 Based on Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2014)
l 0 Parameter of the function of credit rationing on green loans 0.67 Calculated from Eq. (A123) using the initial values of dsr , CAR  and lev B
l 1 Parameter of the function of credit rationing on green loans -0.24 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
l 2 Parameter of the function of credit rationing on green loans (related to the 
sensitivity of credit rationing to the default rate)
2.08 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
l 3 Parameter of the function of credit ratioing on green loans (related to the 
sensitivity of credit rationing to the leverage ratio of banks)
0.04 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
l 4 Parameter of the function of credit ratioing on green loans (related to the 
sensitivity of credit rationing to the capital adequacy ratio of banks)
2.08 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
lev B
max Maximum leverage ratio 33.33 Based on the Basel III regulatory framework (the Basel III bank leverage can be 
proxied by the capital-to-assets ratio and its minimum value is 3%; since in our 
model the bank leverage is defined as the assets-to-capital ratio, the maxium value 
used is equal to 1/0.03)
lf 2 Sensitivity of the labour force-to-population ratio to hazardous waste 0.001 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
lr Rate of decline of land-use CO2 emissions 0.024 Taken from the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); has been adjusted to reflect 
a 1-year time step
p Share of productivity damage in total damage caused by global warming 0.1 Selected from a reasonable range of values
r 0 Parameter of the function of credit rationing on conventional loans 1.50 Calculated from Eq. (A122) using the initial values of dsr , CAR  and lev B
r 1 Parameter of the function of credit rationing on conventional loans -0.24 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
r 2 Parameter of the function of credit rationing on conventional loans (related to 
the sensitivity of credit rationing to the default rate)
2.08 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
r 3 Parameter of the the function of credit ratioing on conventional loans (related 
to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the leverage ratio of banks)
0.04 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
r 4 Parameter of the the function of credit ratioing on conventional loans  (related 
to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the capital adequacy ratio of banks)
2.08 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
rep Loan repayment ratio 0.1 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
S Equilibrium climate sensitivity, i.e. increase in equilibrium temperature due to 
doubling of CO2 concentration from pre-industrial levels (
o
C)
3.1 Taken from then DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016)
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Symbol Description Value Remarks/sources
s B Banks' retention rate 0.86 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario 
s C Share of conventional corporate bonds held by central banks (trillion US$) 0.01 Calculated from Eq. (135) using the initial values of BCCB  and B C
s F Firms' retention rate 0.10 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario 
s G Share of green corporate bonds held by central banks (trillion US$) 0.00 Calculated from Eq. (134) using the initial values of BGCB  and B G
s W Wage income share 0.52 Based on Penn World Table 9.0
t 1 Speed of adjustment parameter in the atmospheric temperature equation 0.020 Taken from the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); has been adjusted to reflect 
a 1-year time step
t 2 Coefficient of heat loss from the atmosphere to the lower ocean (atmospheric 
temperature equation)
0.018 Taken from the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); has been adjusted to reflect 
a 1-year time step
t 3 Coefficient of heat loss from the atmosphere to the lower ocean (lower ocean 
temperature equation)
0.005 Taken from the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); has been adjusted to reflect 
a 1-year time step
w L Risk weight on loans 1.0 Based on BCBS (2006)
w S Risk weight on government securities 0.0 Based on BCBS (2006)
x 10 Autonomous proportion of desired conventional investment funded via bonds 0.02 Calculated from Eq. (A83) using the initial values of yield C and x 1
x 11 Sensitivity of the proportion of desired conventional investment funded via 
bonds to the conventional bond yield
0.10 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
x 21 Sensitivity of the proportion of desired green investment funded via bonds to 
the green bond yield
0.10 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
α 00 Parameter of the desired investment function 0.16 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
α 01 Parameter of the desired investment function 1.35 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
α 1 Parameter of the desired investment function (related to the sensitivity of  
investment to the capacity utilisation)
2.00 Based on econometric estimations for a panel of countries (available upon request)
α 2 Parameter of the desired investment function (related to the sensitivity of 
investment to the rate of profit)
1.84 Based on econometric estimations for a panel of countries (available upon request)
α 3 Parameter of the desired investment function (related to the sensitivity of  
investment to the growth rate of energy intensity)
0.08 Based on econometric estimations for a panel of countries (available upon request)
α 41 Parameter in the investment function (related to the sensitivity of investment to 
the unemployment rate)
0.02 Based on econometric estimations for a panel of countries (available upon request)
α 42 Parameter in the investment function (related to the sensitivity of investment to 
the unemployment rate)
0.5 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
α 51 Parameter in the investment function (related to the sensitivity of investment to 
the energy utilisation rate)
0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
α 52 Parameter in the investment function (related to the sensitivity of investment to 
the energy utilisation rate)
0.99 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
α 61 Parameter in the investment function (related to the sensitivity of investment to 
the matter utilisation rate)
0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
α 62 Parameter in the investment function (related to the sensitivity of investment to 
the matter utilisation rate)
0.99 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
β 1 Autonomous share of desired green investment in total investment 0.02 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
β 2 Sensitivity of the desired green investment share to the interest rate differential 
between green loans/bonds and conventional loans/bonds
2 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
β 3 Sensitivity of the desired green investment share to global warming damages 0.5 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
δ 0 Depreciation rate of capital stock when there are no global warming damages 0.04 Based on Penn World Table 9.0
ε
max Maximum potential value of energy intensity (EJ/trillion US$) 12 Selected such that it is reasonably higher than initial ε
ε
min Minimum potential value of energy intensity (EJ/trillion US$) 3 Selected such that it is reasonably higher than 0
ζ 1 Rate of decline of the (absolute) growth rate of CO2 intensity 0.03 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
ζ 2 Rate of decline of the growth rate of β 0 0.10 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
ζ 3 Rate of decline of the autonomous (absolute) growth rate of  labour 0.01 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
ζ 4 Rate of decline of the growth rates of x 20  and λ 30 0.20 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
ζ 5 Rate of decline of the growth rate of population 0.02 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
ζ 6 Rate of decline of the autonomous labour force-to-population ratio 0.0007 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
η 1 Parameter of damage function 0 Based on Weitzmann (2012); D T =50% when T AT =6
o
C
η 2 Parameter of damage function 0.00284 Based on Weitzmann (2012); D T =50% when T AT =6
o
C
η 3 Parameter of damage function 0.000005 Based on Weitzmann (2012); D T =50% when T AT =6
o
C
λ10 Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.36 Calculated from Eq. (A102) using the initial values of SEC H , V HF , D T , yield C , 
yield G  and Y H
λ10
' Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.10 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ11 Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.03 Calculated from the constraint λ 11 =-λ 21 -λ 31 -λ 41
λ12 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ13 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ14 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ15 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ20 Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.10 Calculated from Eq. (A103) using the initial values of BCH , V HF , D T , yield C , yield G 
and Y H  
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Symbol Description Value Remarks/sources
λ20
' Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.20 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ21 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Calculated from the constraint λ 21 =λ 12
λ22 Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.03 Calculated from the constraint λ 22 =-λ 12 -λ 32 -λ 42
λ23 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ24 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ25 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ30
' Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.00 Global warming damages are assumed to have no impact on the holdings of green 
bonds
λ31 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Calculated from the constraint λ 31 =λ 13
λ32 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Calculated from the constraint λ 32 =λ 23
λ33 Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.03 Calculated from the constraint λ 33 =-λ 13 -λ 23 -λ 43
λ34 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ35 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ40 Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.53 Calculated from the constraint λ 40 =1-λ 10 -λ 20 -λ 30
λ40
' Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.10 Selected from a reasonable range of values 
λ41 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Calculated from the constraint λ 41 =λ14
λ42 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Calculated from the constraint λ 42 =λ 24
λ43 Parameter of households' portfolio choice -0.01 Calculated from the constraint λ 43 =λ 34
λ44 Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.03 Calculated from the constraint λ 44 =-λ 14 -λ 24 -λ 34
λ45 Parameter of households' portfolio choice 0.03 Calculated from the constraint λ 45 =-λ 15 -λ 25 -λ 35
μ
max Maximum potential value of material intensity (kg/US$) 1.5 Selected such that it is reasonably higher than initial μ
μ
min Minimum potential value of material intensity (kg/US$) 0.3 Selected such that it is reasonably higher than 0
ξ Proportion of durable consumption goods discarded every year 0.012 Selected such that the initial growth of DC  is equal to the growth rate of output
π 1 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with material 
intensity
1.01 Calibrated such that initial μ  corresponds to initial κ  and μ (2050)=0.9μ (2015) in line 
with the baseline scenario
π 2 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with material 
intensity
16.29 Calibrated such that initial μ  corresponds to initial κ  and μ (2050)=0.9μ (2015) in line 
with the baseline scenario
π 3 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with recycling rate 6.88 Calibrated such that initial ρ  corresponds to initial κ  and ρ (2050)=1.4ρ (2015) in line 
with the baseline scenario
π 4 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with recycling rate 36.02 Calibrated such that initial ρ  corresponds to initial κ  and ρ (2050)=1.4ρ (2015) in line 
with the baseline scenario
π 5 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with energy 
intensity
9.37 Calibrated such that initial ε corresponds to initial κ  and ε (2050)=0.75ε (2015) in line 
with the baseline scenario
π 6 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with energy 
intensity
53.29 Calibrated such that initial ε  corresponds to initial κ  and ε (2050)=0.75ε (2015) in line 
with the baseline scenario
π 7 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with the share of 
renewable energy 
12.29 Calibrated such that initial θ  corresponds to initial κ  and θ (2050)=0.18 in line with 
the baseline scenario
π 8 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with the share of 
renewable energy 
17.63 Calibrated such that initial θ  corresponds to initial κ  and θ (2050)=0.18 in line with 
the baseline scenario
ρ
max Maximum potential value of recycling rate 0.8 Selected such that it is reasonably lower than 1
σ 1 Autonomous growth rate of labour productivity 0.01 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
σ 2 Sensitivity of labour productivity growth to the growth rate of output 0.92 Empirically estimated using data for a panel of countries (the econometric 
estimations are available upon request)
τ F Firms' tax rate 0.15 Selected from a reasonable range of values
τ H Households' tax rate 0.13 Calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario
φ 11 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the atmosphere to the atmosphere 0.9760 Calculated from the formula φ 11 =1-φ 12  (see the DICE-2016R model, Nordhaus, 
2016)
φ 12 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the atmosphere to the upper 
ocean/biosphere 
0.0240 Taken from the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); has been adjusted to reflect 
a 1-year time step
φ 21 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the upper ocean/biosphere to the 
atmosphere 
0.0392 Calculated from the formula φ 21 =φ 12 (CO2 AT-PRE /CO2 UP-PRE ) (see the DICE-
2016R model, Nordhaus, 2016)
φ 22 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the upper ocean/biosphere to the upper 
ocean/biosphere 
0.9595 Calculated from the formula φ 22 =1-φ 21 -φ 23  (see the DICE-2016R model, 
Nordhaus, 2016)
φ 23 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the upper ocean/biosphere to the lower 
ocean 
0.0013 Taken from the DICE-2016R model (Nordhaus, 2016); has been adjusted to reflect 
a 1-year time step
φ 32 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the lower ocean to the upper 
ocean/biosphere 
0.0003 Calculated from the formula φ 32 =φ 23 (CO2 UP-PRE /CO2 LO-PRE ) (see the DICE-
2016R model, Nordhaus, 2016)
φ 33 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the lower ocean to the lower ocean 0.9997 Calculated from the formula φ 33 =1-φ 32  (see the DICE-2016R model, Nordhaus, 
2016)  
